Introduction
Because savings are generally assumec· to be one of the key sources of economie growth, the factors that determine the saving rate have been analyzed in a voluminous body of literature. Some of these factors, such as demographic and cultural factors, are not easily influenced by policy; others, such as the rate of inflation, the rate of interest, and the leve! and structure of taxes, are largely policy variables. In this paper, we fòcus on the impact of taxationon the household saving rate in a sample of OECD countries.! Theoretical and empirical studies abound on the impact of different types of taxes or of different tax provisions on private saving behavior.
2 Many of these studies have dealt with the American reality, characterized by a relatively stable leve! and structure of taxation, D International Monetary Fund, Washington (USA) .
• Helpful comments from Michael "Keen, Efraim Sadka, and two anonymous referees, as well as assistance and guidance provided by Claire Adams, Paul Masson, and Asegedech W oldeMariam on data matters are gratefu1ly acknowledged.
" 1 See Tanzi and Zee (1997) for a comprehensive examination of the relationship between taxation and growth. For a recent empirical investigation of the nontax determinants of savings, see Masson, Bayoumi, and Samiei (1998) , which covers both OECD countries (with a sample that is almost identical to that of the present paper) and developing countries. Its focus is on national savings (the sum of domestic investment and current account surplus) less savings by the centraI government, rather than on the household saving rate.
2 For an excellent generaI survey of this literature, see Boadway and Wildasin (1994) . OECD (1994) provides a detailed and comprehensive survey of country tax provisions that cauld affect the level and composition of household savings in OECD countries. Review, no. 212, March 2000. over a period of several decades, and by occasionaI important changes in particular tax provisions -such as individuaI retirement accounts (IRAs) -which could affect the rate of saving.
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3 While most of the theoretical channels through which taxes could affect savings have been identified and widely discussed, the empiricalliterature does not convey an overwhelming impression that the effect of taxes on savings is either statistically significant or quantitatively important.
One reason for the inconclusiveness of the empirical results is probably due to the fact that different researchers have used different data sets and/or different definitions of savings and have, consequently, obtained different -and sometimes conflicting -results. Another reason could be that the heavy focus of many of the studies on the United States has meant that much of the existing body of empirical evidence on saving behavior has been dominated by the specific characteristics and circumstances of a single country and may, therefore, lack cross-country generality.
The primary purpose of this paper is to present some direct and, in our view, compelling evidence -largely overlooked in the existing literature -on the impact of taxation on the household saving rate in. OECD countries. This evidence is derived from a panel data set covering 19 OECD countries over a period of two and a half decades . A generaI picture of how the total tax revenue/GDP ratio and the household saving rate changed in these countries between the beginning and the end of this period is depicted in Figure 1 . As Figure  1 shows, only five of the countries (i.e., those in the first quadrant) experienced a rise in both the total tax revenue/GDP ratio and the household saving rate; in the rest of the countries, higher total taxes were generally associated with lower household saViings.
Regression results based on annual observations in fact indicate that the ratios of totai tax revenue, income tax revenue and consumption tax revenue to GDP all bear a statisticalIy significant and negative relationship to the household saving rate. This reiationship is generally statistically significant at the highest confidence level. More specifically, the estimated negative coefficients of the tax variables tendto be particularly high for income taxes and much lower for consumption taxes. It is aiso found that, when the totai tax revenue/GDP ratio is held constant, the household saving rate remains negativeIy cor~elated with the income tax revenue/GDP ratio in a statistically significant way; but its correiation with the consumption tax revenue/GDP ratio becomes statistically insignificant. This could largeIy be interpreted as the effect on the saving behavior of a revenue-neutral repiacement of income with consumption taxes. It is worth pointing out that these results have been obtained on the basis of straightforward regressions on data avaiIable direct1y from the OECD anaIytical database and revenue statistics. N o further transformation of such data has been made, except to correct for pane1 seriai correiation (expIained beIow).
In Section 2, we present our empirical findings on the reiationship between taxation and household saving behavior in OECD countries, preceded by a brief discussion of some of the pertinent theoreticai considerations reiating to this re1ationship. Section 3 concludes the papero The Appendix provides a more detailed discussion of the theoretical issues involved.
Theoretical considerations and empirical evidence

Theoretical considerations
From the theoreticalliterature on taxation, it is a well-known result that, absent labor-Ieisure choice and the bequest motive, a wage tax is equivalent to a consumption tax in present value terms, on account of the intertemporal budget constraint. Since a generaI income tax taxes capitaI incorne in addition to wage income, the difference between the income tax and the consumption tax, in terms of their impact on household savings, hinges solely on the interest rate effect of the formero From this perspective, the sign and magnitude of the interest elasticity of savings is naturally a crucial behavioral parameter, md is in fact the focus of much of the literature on the subject. If this elasticity is positive,4 it would then follow that a tax on income would depress household savings more than a tax on consumption, all other things equal. Our empirical findings reported below are consistent with this theoretical implication.
In addition to, and separate from, the interest elasticity of savings, the income elasticity of consumption -a behavioral parameter that has received relatively little attentioÌl in the literature on taxation and savings -also plays a crucial role (see App~ndix for details) in determining the response of household savings to a change in taxation (be it income or consumption tax). The reason for this is -quite straightforward. Since taxes àffect household disposable income and, therefore, both the numerator and the denominator of the household saving rate, for this rate as a whole to decline following an increase in taxes, alI other things constant, household consumption must decline proportionately less than the decline in their disposable income, that is, their in come elasticity of consumption must be less than unity.5
Our empirical findings are consistent with those from the consumption Iiterature in indicating that consumption is income ineiastic in the short run.
As aggregate data on household savings comprise both savings by the working popuiation and dissavings by the retired, demographic changes with respect to the relative sizes of these ~wo groups couId aiso have an important bearing on observed variations in aggregate savings. F or exampIe, a demographic shift in favor of the former group should theoretically Iead to a rise in savings.
6 While we have not overlooked the possibie reievance of demographic variabies in our empiricai investigation, we are unabie to obtain a meaningfui and statisticalIy significant relationship between such variabies and saving behavior in the data set we used. 
Empirical evidence
The empirical results reported in this paper are based on a panei data set of annuai observations covering 19 OECD countries (identified earlier in Figure 1 ) over the period 1971-95. 8 Data on the independent variabies used in the estimated equation, obtained from OECD (1999b), comprise (1) totai tax revenue/GDP ratio (Xl), (2) income tax revenue/GDP ratio (X2), and (3) consumption tax revenue/GDP ratio (X3). Data on the dependent variabIe, obtained from OECD (1999a), comprise the aggregate household saving rate. The equation has been is approximately equal to unity in the long ron (in the familiar terminology of macroeconomics, this is equivalent to stating that the short-run marginaI propensity to consume (MPC) is below unity while the long-ron MPC is unity). estìmated on the basis of the ordinary Ieast squares (OLS) procedure with country dummies (the so-called fixed-effects model) and using various combinations of the aforementioned tax variabIes. 9 The regression results are reported in Tabie 1 (estimated coefficients of the country dummies are suppressed).
As can be seen from the top half of Tabie 1 (OLS without correction for panei serial correlation), irrespective of the combinations of the tax variabies in the estimated equation, the estimated coefficient of XI is always negative and highIy statistically significant. Thus, higher taxes lead to lower household savings. When X2 or X3 appears jointly in the equation without XI, the estimated coefficients of both of these variables have the expected negative sign and are statistically significant -especially that of X2. It is interesting and important to note that both the absolute magnitude and the level of significance of the estimated income tax coefficient far exceed those of the consumption tax coefficient. The equation has also been estimated with XI paired separately with either X2 or X3. In each instance the estimated coefficient of XI remains negative and highly statistically significant. With XI inc1uded, however, the estimated coefficient of the other tax variabie should be interpreted as measuring its impact on the aggregate household saving rate when the total tax revenue is held constant. In theevent, the estimated income tax coefficient continues to be negative and highly statistically significant. In contrast, the consumption tax coefficient has not only turned positive, it has become statistically insignificant. This is a fundamental implication of the result, noted earlier, that income taxes depress savings more than consumption taxes do, since, with total tax revenue heId constant, variations in consumption taxes Iargely represent variations in income taxes in the opposite direction.
The statistical significance of the estimated coefficients reported above is, however, overstated, given the presence of paneI seriaI correlation as evidenced by the Durbin-Watson statistico Following Masson, Bayoumi and Samiei (1998), the procedure developed by Bhargava, Franzini and Narendranathan (1982) was used to correct for such serial correIation, and the resuIts are reported in the Iower half Based on the procedure of Bhargava, Franzini and Narendranathan (1982) . Note: absolute t-ratios in parentheses; statistical significance is denoted by * (1 percent level), ** (5 percent level), and *** (10 pereent level).
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'" " of Table 1 . 10 What is remarkable about these results is that alI of the condusions have remained substantively unchanged, except that the negative impact on the aggregate household saving rate of consumption taxeshas moved doser to that of income taxes than before. While the adjusted R 2 of all variants of the estimated equation did fall substantially following the correction for serial correiation, this is not unexpected since the only explanatory variables used in the regressions have been the tax revenue/GDP ratios.
On the whole, the above results are in complete accordance with one's theoretical intuition on the relationship between taxation and the household saving rate, as noted earlier. They provide a dear, direct, and compelling case for the negative impact on the latter of the burdens of total taxation, consumption taxation, and, in particuIar, income taxation. They also suggest '(hat a move towards consumption 'relative to income taxation could Iead to a higher rate of aggregate household savings.
Concluding remarks
The potential determinants of a country's saving rate are numerous, and are likeIy to encompass both tax and nontax factors. This paper has focused on the relationship between the aggregate household saving rate and taxation in a sampie of OECD countries over a period of two and a half decades .
The empirical evidence reported in this paper suggests that the negative impact of total taxes, income taxes and consumption taxes (all expressed as shares of GDP) on the household saving rate is compelling. The evidence also supports the conventional view that the impact of income taxes on household savings is much greater than that of consumption taxes. Therefore, an equal yield repiacement of the former. by the latter could actually raise the household saving rate. T o our knowledge, these findings provide the strongest direct evidence avaiIable so far in the literature on the relationship between lO As indicated in Table 1 , the estimated panel serial correlation coefficients for aH variants of the equation were about 0.91, suggesting that a first-differencing procedure would also have largely corrected for the serial correlation. taxation and savings. They have very important implications for tax policy regarding the choice of income and consumption taxation in tax systems when promoting savings is an important policy objective.
APPENDIX
This appendix provides a detailed discussion of the analytics of taxation and the saving rate, and underscores the important role the income elasticity of consumption plays in the analysis. To render the analytics as simple as possibI e, consider a two-period life-cycle model of savings, in which an individuaI works (at the wage rate w) in the first period and retires in the secondo Consumption during retirement is, therefore, financed entirely by savings (with interest at the rate r) undertaken during the working periodo For simplicity, it is assumed that labor supply is fixed and both w andr are time-invariant.! Using the superscripts "y" and "o" on variables to denote those pertaining to the young and the old, respectively, a young individual's budget constraint in any period t is given by (1) w (1 -'t) = c; (
where c is per capita consumption, s is per capita savings, !' is the income tax rate, and v is the consumption tax rate. In the following peri od, i.e., period t + 1, this individuaI is retired and faces the budget constraint
Equations (1) and (2) can be co mb in ed to yield the individual's familiar lifeti me budget constraint as (3) where Q == w (1 -'t)/(1 + v) is the present value of the individual's effective life-time disposable income. The consumption tax plays a role in determining this in come because the tax is applicable at the same rate on consumption in both periods and, therefore, has the effect of reducing the life-time income available for consumption. Standard utility maximization by the individuaI produces the demand for consumption when young as a function of the effective life-time disposable income and the after-tax rate.of interest:
The variable s~ in equations (1) and (2) represents only savings undertaken by the young. As such, it is not cornparable to the aggregate personal or household savings as typically rneasured in national accounts, which would incorporate the (dis)savings of the old. Since the old receives only interest incorne, the old's (dis)savings in any period t is, by definition,
that is, it is the interest incorne received on -the savings (undertaken when young in the previous period) less consurnption . . Substituting equation (2) into equation (5) yields (6) o (
which indicates that the old dissaves by consurning the principal that was saved in the previous periodo If the size of population grows at the rate n, then savings by the young in any two successive periods are related to each other by (7) s; = (1 + n) S;_l' Total per capita savings in any period t is siniply the surn of the young's savings and the old's (dis)savings in that periodo With the use of equations (6) and (7), this surn can be shown to be (8) St = S ; + s ~ = s ; -s; /(1 + n) = s; n/(l + n).
Note that,in the present frarnework, totaI per capita savings are zero when n = O, since with no population growth, savings by the young are necessarily counterbalanced by (dis)savings by the old. The disposable incorne, m, of the individuaI when young is sirnply the after-tax wage incorne:
m; = w (1-T), while that of the individuaI when old is the after-tax interest incorne:
(10) m ~ = r (1 -T) s ;_1 = r (1 -T) s ; /(1 + n).
Total per· capita disposable incorne ~n any period t is, therefore,
Let et == s/ rnt be the aggregate household saving rate. It proves convenient to work with the inverse of this ratio (assurning n :I; O). By using equations (8) and (11), the inverse of the saving rate can be expressed as (12) 1/8, = w(l-.)(1 + n)/(n s;) + r (l-.)/n_ Equation (12) can be used to assess how changes in the income tax rate T, consumption tax rate v, and population growth rate n wouldaffect the aggregate household saving rate. Since the right-hand side of equation (12) contains 5 ;, which is a function of both T and v, a first step in this assessment would be to ascertain the impact of changes in T and v on the savings of the young_ Totally differentiating equation (1), with the use of equation (4) Equation (13) shows that a change in the income tax rate has two distinct but familiar effects on the young's savings: an increase in Twould lower 5; by lowering the disposable income (the first term on the right-hand side of equation 13); it would also lowers;by reducing the after-tax rate of return to savings (the second term), provided that (j is positive (the normal case). In contrast, sin ce the consumption tax reduces the individual's effictive life-time disposable income, as noted earlier, the impact of a change in the consumption tax rate on the young's savings is dependent on the income elasticity of the young's consumption (the third term): an increase in v would lower 5 ; only if 11 < 1, i.e., the young's consumption is income inelastic so that a higher consumption tax leads to a higher total consumption spending when young, thus reducing savings. If 11 > 1, the outcome would be reversed. Arrned with equation (B), it is now straightforward to assess the irnpact of changes in the tax and dernographic variables on the aggregate household saving rate. Differentiating equation (12) with respect to .. yields (14) d(1I8,)/ d. = [(1 -11)(1 -8 ;)/8; + 8 -r 8; /(1 + n)J(1 + n)/(n8 ;).
The sign of equation (14) is ambiguousj it is dependent on the signs of the three terrns inside the square brackets on the equation's right-hand side. The first terrn represents the incorne effect and rneasures how a change in .. would affect the young's consurnption relative to the young's disposable income. If the incorne elasticity of the young's consurnption is inelastic (i.e., 11 < 1), then the arnount of the young's savings would falI in response to a rise in " which in tum would irnply a drop in the young's own saving rate. AlI other things equal, this would also result in a drop in the aggregate household saving rate, as evidenced by the positive sign of the first terrn when 11 < 1. Clearly, this incorne effect would disappear if the young's consurnption is proportional to disposable incorne.
The second terrn is the interest elasticity of the young's savings and rneasures the interest rate effect. If it is positive (i.e., 8 > O), then a rise in ..
would (alI other things equal) also reduce the aggregate hbusehold saving rate. The third terrn represents the dernographic effect and' rneasures the irnpact of the incorne tax on the disposable incorne of the old. It is unarnbiguously negative because a rise in .. necessarily reduces the old's after-tax interest incorne but not its arnount of dissavings. By itself, this would also lower the aggregate disposable incorne and, therefore, raise the aggregate household saving rate. Hence, the overalI irnpact of a rise in .. on the aggregate household saving rate is a priori uncertain. It is interesting to note that, if the underlying utility function is Cobb-Douglas, i.e., 11 = 1 and 8 = O, the aggregate household savi.p.g rate would be positively correlated with the incorne tax rate, on account of the dernographic effe et alone. The irnpact on the aggregate household saving rate of a change in the consurnption tax rate is likewise arnbiguous and dependent on the incorne elasticity of the young's consurnption, as can be seen by differentiating equation (12) with respect to v to get (15) d(1I8,)/dv = (1 -11)(1 + n)(1-8;)/[n(8;rJ.
Note that the expression on the right-hand side of equation (15) is identical to the incorne effect of a change in the incorne tax rate (see equation 14) . This corresponds to the welI-known proposition that, frorn a life-cycle perspective, a consurnption tax is equivalent to an incorne tax if the latter excludes interest incorne.
FinalIy, the aggregate household saving rate can be altered by a change in the population growth rate. Differentiating equation (12) 
